The Theater Enabling Commands (TEC) are among the highest level operational organizations in the United States Army. As part of the Army's transformation of the past decade, the integration of the TECs promoted significant changes in structure, doctrine, and employment. However, the transformation of the TECs is incomplete and most importantly not fully tested. In this age of austerity, the Army will need to realize its millennial transformation as it will not be able to justify having organizations in the transformed force structure that are not being fully utilized; especially now that the Army is looking to transform itself again as a part of the envisioned Joint Force 2020. This paper analyzes the state of TEC transformation, reasons why Theater Army transformation remains incomplete, and proposes recommendations for the future.
These recommendations include adopting an Army culture of innovation at the operational / strategic level, finishing the TEC transformations and avoiding succumbing to a call to return to the pre-transformation ways of functional support, as well as improving the professional development training of theater army doctrine.
Organizational Courage: Following Through On Enabling Transformation Innovations In Theater
To realize true change requires a willingness to question the foundational beliefs on which everything depends.
-Kim van Alkemade 1 During the first decade of the millennium, the United States Army underwent its "most comprehensive transformation" in sixty years. 2 In development prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, the Army's shift to the organizational concept of modularity was advanced in 1999 by then Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric K. Shinseki, who was intent on making "heavy forces…more strategically deployable and more agile with a smaller logistical footprint, and light forces…more lethal, survivable, and tactically mobile." 3 Transformation's multi-faceted modularity process would integrate "standardized, expandable, Army elements capable of being [adapted] to accomplish virtually any assignment." 4 This would produce a "tactical force with a larger number of more aggregated capabilities" better suited to support Combatant Commanders' land power requirements as part of the greater Joint Force. 5 The shift to a modular force structure was to maximize the flexibility of force tailoring to support the Army's goal to "use only those forces absolutely necessary" 6 to efficiently "respond to a diverse spectrum of" 7 global operations. This in turn would support the vision to transform the Army "into a strategically responsive force that is dominant across the full spectrum of operations" 8 and able to "field a combat-ready brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a division within 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 days." Afghanistan and Iraq. 11 The resulting transformation blueprint "altered every echelon of the force from battalion to [theater] army" 12 with its revamped "combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations." 13 Much of this was subsequently codified in Army doctrine. However, this formalization did not drive full adherence to the transformation plan. Certain aspects were not implemented and/or tested for their effectiveness. Instead, in a number of cases, localized workarounds were created for missions that were supposed to be executed by designated transformed organizations.
The selective endorsement of transformation and modular organizations impeded institutional innovation and resulted in the Army not realizing the full potential of its millennial transformation.
In 2013, the Army is moving forward with a new call for change -this time to rebalance the force structure while retaining operational adaptability and evolving into the Army of 2020. 14 This call for change could herald an opportunity to refine the previous transformation process to the ever shifting strategic environment except that the Army has not yet completed its transformation to modularity. Indeed, some of the ideas being touted for the newest round of Army reforms are similar to those presented to validate transformation. The Army appears to have succumbed to the novelty of meeting a new(er) strategy, without regard to the benefit of maximizing what is already in place -all to meet the similar objectives and "maintain a credible capacity to win decisively and support combatant commanders across a wide range of military operations at home and abroad." 15 The Army's inconsistent commitment to 3 transformation's modular way of doing business also contradicts the Army ideal of a culture of innovation with the mantra of "adapt or die." 16 The Army could benefit from taking a critical look at its implementation of the transformation to modularity before moving on to another set of changes. A pause to assess the current situation is especially critical in this post-war resource constrained environment specifically as the Army may be called on to justify having organizations in the transformed force structure that are not being fully utilized. It also behooves the Army to ensure it has not missed opportunities to adapt existing solutions to its latest change requirements. A critical examination of modularity may reveal that the Army already has some of the framework for further change for Joint Force 2020 in place.
Therefore, the Army needs to reconsider the possibility of completing its millennial transformation first, before beginning another program of change. Having all transformations in place may be capable of moving the Army towards its objective "to adapt the Army to more effectively provide land power" and "provide modernized and ready, tailored land force capabilities to meet combatant commanders' requirements across the range of military operations." 17 This paper will assess the transformation of some of the Army's highest level operational organizations, namely the Theater Army Enabling Commands. To limit the scope, this paper will not delve into the entirety of the comprehensive transformation design. It will include an overview of the Theater Army Headquarters and Theater
Enabling Commands as well as modular brigade concepts. It will describe aspects of Theater Army transformation that were not fully implemented and consider possible reasons for this selectivity. It will conclude with observations about the benefits of 4 completing the Army's transformation to modularity and promoting the Army's culture of innovation to ensure optimization of all of its organizations in this time of resource challenges.
Implementation of Modularity
The early 1990s saw the genesis of the Army's transformational shift to modularity. Even though the Cold War U.S. Army had successfully defeated Saddam
Hussein and driven the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait in 1991, two factors supported an Army overhaul to improve its strategic responsiveness and maintain its relevancy. These were the critical assessment of the cumbersome five month build-up of land forces prior to the commencement of Operation Desert Storm, and the re-evaluation of the Army's future roles and missions precipitated by the collapse of the Soviet Union. 18 The Army determined it had to adapt "to meet the realities of…current and future
[strategic] environments," 19 by becoming more expeditionary, and changing its organizational design and culture (mindset) to realize a thorough transformation.
Advances in technology facilitated changes to "how the Army [was to be] structured and conduct operations." 20 In addition to revamping unit types, roles, and responsibilities, the Army's shift to modularity promoted a "flatter and less rigidly hierarchical" 21 organizational design which supported a dramatic change to the Command and Control (C2) of Theater Army units.
To better support the comprehensive Army-wide shift to modularity, complementary adjustments were needed to the Army's institutional systems in all areas from personnel management to training and education, healthcare and procurement. 22 However, the most change -and ultimately the biggest challenge would be developing a transformed theater structure that would enable the Army to provide the However, tactical brigades would continue to be assigned to either a Division level
Headquarters or a Three Star Operational level headquarters. 43 The most recognized and celebrated modularity change was the restructuring of the Army's brigades. 44 This shifting of the Army from its World War II initiated divisioncentric focus to a brigade-based organization was to create a "lighter and more mobile" 45 force deemed "superior" in terms of "deployability, employability and sustainability." 46 Under transformation, brigades were to become the deployable building blocks of the modular force with the capacity to move from one Theater to "plug and play" 47 The Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) was developed to meet "the need for establishing a single sustainment command and control (C2) element for theater logistics" 57 and facilitate the theater army's dominant role in sustaining Army and joint forces (as directed). 58 The TSC consolidated echelons of sustainment units formerly assigned to Corps and Divisions, and subsequently transformed into functional Sustainment Brigades. 59 The TSC was designed to execute "the Theater Army's AORwide support responsibilities" 60 to provide "sustainment (less medical) for all Army forces forward-stationed, transiting, or operating within the" Theater; 61 plan and conduct theater opening; conduct reception, staging, onward movement and integration; and provide Common User Logistics. The TSC would accomplish its Theater mission through its forward-deployed command post, the Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC), maintaining "direct mission command over the sustainment units providing support within the areas of operation." 62 The medical enabling command, the Medical Command (Deployment Support) (MEDCOM(DS)), is structured to operate in coordination with the TSC and serve as "the theater's senior medical force provider in support of the theater army." 63 The MEDCOM
(DS) provides Army health system services through its subordinate medical brigades and battalions which have a Direct Support/General Support relationship with the operational forces in the JOA. The MEDCOM usually maintains C2 of its medical brigades to retain the "ability to rapidly task-organize and reallocate medical assets across command and geographical boundaries" 64 in the AOR.
Another enabling command similarly organized, is the Signal Command Theater (SC(T)). This TEC was created to provide "communications and information systems support to theater, joint, governmental, and multinational forces as required." 65 The SC(T) is a TEC with a unique relationship with its higher DRU headquarters as it is assigned to the U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command/9th Signal Command (Army) (NETCOM/9thSC(A)), while under operational control of the Theater Headquarters. 66 Another transformed theater capability is the Civil Affairs Command (CACOM).
This specialized enabling command is focused primarily on providing Strategic Level civil affairs expertise through the allocation of staff augmentation to the GCC and Theater Army Headquarters. 67 The CACOM maintains an administrative relationship with its higher headquarters USACAPOC (U. S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological
Operations Command) while under the operational control of the ASCC. 68 The fifth Theater Enabling Command is the Military Intelligence Brigade (MIB).
The MIB provides multi-discipline intelligence support to include "regionally focused intelligence collection and analysis" for the theater army and other U.S. and coalition forces operating "in JOAs within the AOR" as required. 69 It provides support via reachback to higher assets and from MIB subordinate battalion collection or analysis assets attached or under OPCON or direct support to the operational ARFOR. 70 The MIB is another TEC with dual higher headquarters; assigned to the U.S. Army Support (DS/GS). 78 Leaders who had never worked in or with an ASCC had limited understanding of and at times unease with, the new Theater Army construct and were led to rely on tactical C2 lessons that often did not apply at this organizational level. An added challenge was transforming while supporting the GWOT and adjusting to varying strategic commitments and pace of change driven by resource availability.
When the ASCC was first proposed, the intent was to create a set of standardized ASCCs and ultimately develop the force structure to achieve complete joint interdependence. A case in point is the Joint Logistics Enterprise, envisioned to build on the efficiency of an Army TSC. However, instead of being driven by doctrine, the transformation of theater enabling capabilities was driven by personality, with leaders making indiscriminate and ill-informed changes to the standard organizational templates. This made the flattened and integrated Theater Army organization all the more confusing and the lack of understanding persists to this day. Therefore, the sustainment and signal enabling commands continue to operate at only partial capacity, even though they are doctrinally mandated as the functional experts to manage functionally alike units and execute direct / general support to theater units. Army." 95 It should be accepted that change will not happen overnight, but before moving on to new options, the Army should finish, test and evaluate the current planned changes. 96 Resistance can also be overcome through the application of the following tenets:
every single person in the organization is invested in the organization's success and feels a responsibility to implement new and better ways to achieve organizational objectives. People are encouraged to try alternative paths, test ideas to the point of failure, and learn from the experience. Experimentation and prudent risk taking are admired and encouraged. Experimentation is not a destination to be reached, but an unending process of trial, feedback, learning, renewal and experimentation again. The organization as a whole is agile, ready to learn, continually changing, and improving. It is fast, flexible and never prepared to say "we have finished getting better." Innovative organizations depend less on forecasting, planning and control and more on scanning, agility and feedback. Innovative organizations embrace uncertainty, recognizing that an uncertain future potentially holds as many opportunities as it does threats. 97 Adapting these to improve the Army's institutional agility supports a "culture of innovation." 98 The disinclination to test the TECs and in particular the TSC and SC(T),
demonstrates the Army has not fully adopted innovation. The opportunity to remedy this will be missed if ad hoc modifications to transformed organizations are not resolved.
However, it appears in some areas, especially at the Division level and below, there is a willingness to take a chance and experiment. 
Conclusion
Transformation produced unique concepts to change the Army. In some cases, as units underwent the process of modularization, the desired changes failed to be implemented or "were implemented in such a watered-down manner" as to lose the full effect and benefit of transforming in the first place. 101 The transform, the Army conformed to its tendency to preserve "traditional structure"
because of its "lack of desire to experiment with major changes." 103 Then with its can do culture, the Army created workarounds for these self imposed constraints. The Army deliberately allowed a dual force structure (transformed and non-transformed) for the execution of specific functions. In this age of austerity, the Army will need to determine whether it wants to move forward and realize its millennial transformation or dismantle its transformed organizations, endorse the workarounds and revert to the old way of doing things. The Army ultimately needs to go from the can-do culture to the innovative can-do-it-better culture willing to adapt to change. We can better the Army by promoting a culture of innovation -Adapt / Innovate / Learn, in order to carry the Army forward to 2020 and beyond.
